Ghana is often celebrated as one of Africa’s most stable democracies—peaceful transitions of power, competitive elections, and a vibrant civic sphere (Gyimah-Boadi 2009; Paller 2019). Yet beneath this democratic success lies a stubborn paradox: political authority remains profoundly centralized. Despite more than three decades of multi-party elections and over four decades of decentralization reforms, Ghana’s local governments still operate with limited autonomy, weak fiscal power, and little grassroots influence (Crawford 2009).
Why has a country widely praised for democratic consolidation struggled so deeply to devolve authority?
This blog reflects on Ghana’s experience to explore how historical legacies, political incentives, and structural constraints have combined to entrench centralized governance in one of Africa’s most politically admired states.
Colonial Legacies and the Uneven Foundations of Statehood
Ghana’s centralization story begins long before independence. Under British colonial rule, local administrations were never designed to empower the indigenous population. Education was limited, administrative training was minimal, and public institutions were built to serve colonial interests. By the early 1950s, only a tiny number of Ghanaians had received university-level education (Foster 1965). Local councils focused mainly on tax collection rather than policymaking or development planning (Nugent 2010).
At independence in 1957, Kwame Nkrumah inherited this thin institutional foundation. Centralization became a deliberate strategy for national unity and rapid modernization, especially in the face of rival political groups advocating federalist arrangements that he feared could fracture the new state (Rathbone 2000). These early decisions—shaped by colonial underinvestment and post-colonial urgency—set Ghana on a path where power gravitated toward Accra and away from the regions.
Coups, Instability, and the Deepening of Central Control
Between 1966 and 1992, Ghana experienced four successful military coups that repeatedly disrupted institutional continuity and reinforced central authority (Gocking 2005). Each regime reversed its predecessor’s policies, purged bureaucracies, and asserted control from the national capital. Local governance barely evolved during this era.
Even when the Rawlings-led Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) introduced decentralization reforms in 1988, these reforms came with tight restrictions: political parties were barred from local elections, and district chief executives remained presidential appointees (Ayee 2008). Local assemblies gained administrative responsibilities but not genuine political power.
By the time democratic rule returned in 1992, centralization was not just a governance arrangement; it had become a deeply embedded political culture.
Democracy Without Devolution? The Post-1992 Puzzle
The post-1992 democratic transition raised hopes for devolution. Yet party competition quickly collided with reform ambitions. Since 1992, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have alternated power in fiercely contested elections often decided by narrow margins. Both have strong regional bases, and in a winner-takes-all system, devolving power risks strengthening opposition strongholds (Nathan 2019).
As a result, successive governments—regardless of party—have preserved presidential appointment of metropolitan, municipal, and district chief executives (MMDCEs). These leaders remain accountable upward to the presidency rather than downward to local citizens. Interviews with municipal officials reveal widespread frustration with appointees chosen for party loyalty rather than competence.
Fiscal structures reinforce the imbalance. Local governments receive roughly 5 percent of the national budget, with transfers often delayed (Banful 2011). Without adequate resources or autonomy, districts cannot plan, innovate, or meet community needs. Ghana’s version of decentralization has thus remained more administrative than political, a system where national leaders retain control even as democratic participation expands.
Why It Matters—and Why Ghana’s Story Resonates Globally
Ghana’s experience shows how difficult devolution becomes when historical legacies intersect with political survival strategies. Even strong democracies hesitate to share power if doing so threatens electoral interests or territorial influence. More broadly, Ghana illustrates a dilemma facing many post-colonial states: inherited administrative weaknesses and uneven development make leaders wary of devolving authority before strengthening the state.
Yet without devolution, local innovation stalls, accountability weakens, and citizens lose trust in local institutions. Effective decentralization requires more than elections. It demands capacity-building, predictable fiscal transfers, and political incentives that value local empowerment rather than fear it (Heller 2001).
Ghana’s story invites a broader rethinking of decentralization in the Global South. By grappling with historical constraints and political realities, states can build more responsive, locally grounded systems that strengthen both democracy and development.
Connect with the Authors

Isaac Asante-Wusu is a critical human geographer, a community-engaged researcher, an interdisciplinary social scientist. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography with a minor in Development Studies and Social Change from the University of Minnesota, an M.A. in Geography from Miami University, and a B.Sc. (Hons) in Development Planning from Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology, Kumasi, Ghana. His research spans democracy, the developmental state, institutional political economy, water governance, and environmental justice, with a regional focus on Africa. His work examines how historical legacies, political structures, and state capacity shape governance outcomes in post-colonial contexts. Isaac has conducted extensive field research in Ghana and South Africa and is committed to bridging academic scholarship with public policy debates on equitable development.