War, State, and the Limits of Return: Left-Behind Places in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991–2013)

“War made the state, and the state made war.” Charles Tilly’s (1975) well-known thesis is not only a theoretical claim- in the Balkans, it becomes a lived reality. Bosnia and Herzegovina offers one of the clearest examples of how war and state formation are deeply intertwined.

After World War II, Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). It declared independence in 1992. The country had a complex, multi-ethnic structure composed of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. However, its recent history has been shaped primarily by the 1992–1995 war, forced displacement, and genocide.

The outbreak of war in 1992 triggered what is called “war-induced migration.” Around 1 million people were internally displaced, and 1.2 million left the country as refugees (Ramet, 2002; Tabeau, 2009; Sotirović, 2013). This was not a temporary movement. It created a long-term and layered mobility regime.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, mobility takes multiple forms: international migration, forced migration, internal displacement, and rural–urban shifts. These processes overlap. A more precise question is: under what conditions are they unable to return?

Return more than Policy: Memory, Space, and Everyday Life

Return is often framed as a legal right. The Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) formally guaranteed property restitution and the right to return under Annex VII. However, implementation has depended on administrative procedures, registration systems, and local institutional capacity. Infrastructure plays a central role here. It should not be reduced to physical networks such as roads. In many post-war municipalities, weak access to health care, education, and employment has made return difficult in practice.

As Chandler (2000) argues, the post-war system produced a form of “managed peace.” It froze the conflict but did not rebuild the social foundations necessary for sustainable return.

Policy frameworks often treat return as a linear and desirable outcome (Black, 2001; Mackenzie et al., 2007; Eastmond, 2006; Long, 2013). Return is not only about physical relocation. It is also about memory, belonging, and security. Studies show that return is shaped by loss, distrust, and the symbolic meaning of home (Eastmond, 2006, 2007; Stefansson, 2006; Yuval-Davis, 2006).

Memory is not passive. It is actively produced through narratives and social interaction (Portelli, 1991; Thompson, 2000). Halilović’s (2013, 2015) concept of “moral geographies” shows that pre-war homes are no longer neutral spaces. They are shaped by fear and loss.

In this context, people are not passive recipients of policy. Not returning is often not a matter of unwillingness. It is a rational response to structural constraints.

Left Behind Places: Eastern vs. Western Bosnia

Using census data from 1991 and 2013, along with selected economic indicators, the research reveals strong effects and post-war transformation in the municipalities of Eastern Bosnia (Foča, Srebrenica, Zvornik) compared to cases in Western and Southern Bosnia and Herzegovina (Prijedor, Livno, Čapljina).

No region in Bosnia and Herzegovina was left unaffected by the war. For this reason, the analysis adopts a comparative approach, examining regions most heavily affected by displacement alongside those experiencing relatively lower levels of disruption. The war began in Eastern Bosnia in 1992 and expanded to parts of Western Bosnia in 1993. However, the long-term outcomes are uneven.

Table: Demographic Indicators of Left-Behind Places in Selected Municipalities, Bosnia and Herzegovina (1991–2013)

Municipality	Pop Change %	Avg Age	Rural Age	Uninhabited Settlements (Δ)	Ethnic Change	Left-Behind Intensity
Srebrenica	-63.4%	39.2	38.7	N/A	Bosniak→mixed/shift	Very High
Foča (FBiH)	-62.5%	43.9	43.9	+1	N/A	Very High
Foča (RS)	-48.3%	43.3	48.3	+8	Bosniak → Serb	Very High
Prijedor	-20.6%	41.5	41.2	N/A	N/A	Moderate
Livno	-15.9%	40.9	41.1	N/A	Croat → stronger	Moderate
Zvornik	-12.4%	38.8	38.6	N/A	Bosniak → Serb	Moderate
Čapljina	-6.2%	39.9	39.8	+1	Croat → stronger	Low

Note: Data compiled by the author.

The data reveal a clear pattern: municipalities in Eastern Bosnia are characterized by severe population loss, advanced ageing, and the abandonment of settlements. In some cases, population decline exceeds 50 percent. These trends point not only to demographic change but to a deeper process of social and spatial erosion.

Settlement networks are fragmenting, rural areas are emptying, and the capacity to sustain everyday life is weakening. In contrast, municipalities in Western Bosnia and Herzegovina exhibit comparatively more stable demographic trajectories. This divergence suggests that the intensity and spatial progression of wartime violence produced uneven and long-lasting regional outcomes.

Why Do People Not Return? Beyond the Right to Return

The key question remains: why do people not return?

Return is often framed as a matter of rights or individual choice. In practice, however, it is shaped by structural conditions. If there are no jobs, no schools, and limited access to health care, the return is not viable. If social networks are fractured and trust is eroded, return becomes increasingly unlikely.

In such contexts, return persists as a formal right but not a practical option. The case of Bosniak returns to Republika Srpska illustrates this clearly, where decisions are shaped by ongoing security concerns, institutional barriers, and experiences of social exclusion (Bieber, 2006; Toal & Dahlman, 2011).

This is precisely where the concept of left-behind places becomes analytically useful. Rather than treating non-return as an individual outcome, it shifts attention to the conditions of places themselves. Left-behind places are not simply those affected by war, but those that have experienced sustained decline in economic opportunities, social infrastructure, and institutional capacity. In such contexts, the absence of return is not surprising; it is structurally produced.

This shifts the analytical focus. Return cannot be understood in isolation, nor reduced to a legal entitlement. The patterns observed across Bosnia and Herzegovina: population decline, accelerated ageing, and the abandonment of rural settlements, are not only demographic trends. They are indicators of place-based decline. In many municipalities, these processes have reached a point where the material and social conditions necessary for return have eroded.

In this sense, the question is no longer only why people do not return. It is whether there is anything left to return to.

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Offline Reference:

Chandler, D. (2000). Bosnia: Faking democracy after Dayton. Pluto Press.

Cvitković, I. (Ed.). (2017). Demografske i etničke promjene u BiH [Demographic and ethnic changes in BiH] (Posebna izdanja, Knjiga CLXXII, Odjeljenje društvenih nauka, Knjiga 9). Akademija nauka i umjetnosti Bosne i Hercegovine.

Long, K. (2013). The point of no return: Refugees, rights, and repatriation. Oxford University Press.

Tabeau, E. (Ed.). (2009). War in Numbers: Demographic Losses in the Wars in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999. Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia

Thompson, P. (2000). The voice of the past: Oral history (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Tilly, C. (1975). Reflections on the history of European state-making. In C. Tilly (Ed.), The formation of national states in Western Europe (pp. 3–83). Princeton University Press.

Toal, G., & Dahlman, C. (2011). Bosnia remade: Ethnic cleansing and its reversal. Oxford University Press.

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