

EPRC

Integrated Territorial Investments in Poland: Empowering Local Actors in the EU Cohesion Policy

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Plan of the presentation

Introduction




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graph TD; A[Introduction] --> B[Research design]; B --> C[Implications]; C --> D[Conclusion];
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Research design


Implications

Conclusion

Integrated Territorial Investments




Source: Van der Zwet et al, 2017



Source: Wolanski (ed.), 2018

Formal ITI governance



Project selection and generation tasks SUD strategies.
Source: Van der Zwet et al., 2017

Remaining questions

What is the informal governance of ITI?

Which local actors got empowered by ITI?

Which policy aspects do they influence?

How do they influence the policy in practice?

Plan of the presentation

Introduction

Research design

Implications

Conclusion

Research Design

Aims

- **Explore** the role of political factors in ITI implementation;
- Understand and present the process of inter-municipal collaboration from the **perspective of local and regional actors.**

Theory

- **Institutional Collective Action Framework** (Feiock, 2004; 2013)

Question

- **What is the role of political factors** in solving collective action dilemmas during the implementation of ITI in Poland?


Methods

- Data collection: participatory observation, interviews, documents
- Data analysis: qualitative content analysis
- **Organisational ethnography**



*The ICA
Framework.*

Source: own
elaboration on
the basis of:
Feiock, 2013)



Potential collective benefit

Each actor's individual risk assessment

Sources
of collaboration risk

Nature of ICA
dilemma

Actor
characteristics

Existing
institutions

Collaboration
risks

Incoordination

Division

Defection

Transaction
costs

Information

Negotiation
& bargaining

Enforcement

Integration mechanism

Case study choice

Enforcement method Scope of collaboration	Embeddedness	Contracts	Delegated Authority	Imposed Authority
	Encompassing Complex Collective	City-regions/ Network cities	Multi-Purpose Municipal Associations	Regional/ Metropolitan Governments
Intermediate Multilateral	Social Welfare Networks	Single-Purpose Municipal Associations	Inter-municipal Corporations	Metropolitan Transportation Authorities
Narrow Single Purpose Bilateral	Informal Working Groups	Interlocal Agreements	Municipal Corporations	Cynsorcios and Syndicats Mixtes

---Decision Costs +++ ↑

---Autonomy Costs+++ →

Policy instruments for mitigating ICA dilemmas in European countries.

Adapted from: (Tavarez, Feiock 2017, p. 15)

Central Subregion Śląskie



- Association
- 2.76 mln people
- 739 mln €
- 81 partners
- Competitive




Lublin Functional Area Lubelskie




- Agreement
- 0.55 mln people
- 105 mln €
- 16 partners
- Non-competitive

Fieldwork in numbers



- 6/5 • weeks
- 23/26 • interviewees
- 18/9 • events
- 2/8 • study visits
- 10/10 • municipalities
- 636/428 • km
- ∞ • conversations
- ∞ • notes



Category	Subcategory	Coding nodes	Segments
Potential collective benefit	None	Potential collective benefit	267
Sources of collaboration risks	Nature of the ICA dilemma	Coordination gains	192
		Economies of scale	54
		Common-pool resources	3
		Internalising externalities	16
	Actor characteristics	Leaders	192
		Mayors	271
		Metropolitan administration	366
		Local councillors	17
		Local civil servants	72
		Regional Actors	117
		National Actors	54
		General	160
	Existing institutions	Community	131
		Higher-level rules	207
Political structure		60	
Collaboration risks	Existing ICA mechanisms	88	
	Division	Incoordination	65
	Division	Division	218
	Defection	Defection	69
Transaction costs	Non-strategic joint project risks	Non-strategic joint project risks	146
	Information	Information	208
	Negotiation & Bargaining	Negotiation & Bargaining	281
	Enforcement	Enforcement	222
Integration mechanism	Joint project assessment costs	Joint project assessment costs	264
	None	Integration mechanism	147
TOTAL			3887

Agenda


Introduction

Research design

Implications

Conclusion

Accountability



Who got empowered?

Mayors (ITI Board/ITI Assembly, SMALL MUNICIPALITIES)

Metropolitan administration (identity)

Local civil servants

Local councillors

Local NGOs, private companies, universities

Local citizens

Which policy aspects do mayors influence? And how?

ITI strategy

- Exchanging data, analysing joint problems
- Preparing joint objectives

Preselected investments

- (Some) partnership/coordinated projects
- (Some) planning of the whole area

Funds division

- Per capita allocation (fair/strategic/**pork-barrel**)
- Thematic division

Selection criteria

- Prioritised groups of beneficiaries (ITI, small, recommended)
- Preferred kinds of investments

Scope of collaboration

- Mutual learning, avoiding duplication, functional coordination
- Scale effect initiatives: Joint expertise, procurement, services

ITI limiting regional 'pork-barrel' politics?

I do not belong to any party, I'm telling you. If we really think in terms of strategic development of the region, it is difficult not to recognize our municipality as one of the most important elements of its development. Unfortunately, we are not perceived by the voivodship board as strategic. If you saw the targeting of ROP funds, there are mostly municipalities that follow the party line. And with ITI we finally have the same chance for EU funds as everybody else. The Marshal has nothing to say. (Interview L_Mayor_M2_17.11.2017)

Conclusion

Not only formal task delegation, also informal role in policy

Most empowered actors: mayors, metropolitan administration

Important role of politicians in ITI – require collaboration, strategic decisions and negotiations

Important to invest in leaders representing agglomeration's interests: ITI office and board – trust building, broader interest

References

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4. Van der Zwet A., Bachtler J., Ferry, M., McMaster, I., & Miller, S. (2017). *Integrated territorial and urban strategies: how are ESIF adding value in 2014-2020? Final Report*. Brussels.;
5. Wolanski, M. (2018) (Ed.) *Ewaluacja Systemu Realizacji Instrumentu ZIT w Perspektywie Finansowej UE na lata 2014-2020. Raport Koncowy*, Ministerstwo Inwestycji i Rozwoju, Warszawa.

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THANK YOU!

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


RESULTS

Potential collective benefit



Each actor's individual risk assessment



Integration mechanism

Potential collective benefit

‘We can be an oasis of prosperity here, but you cannot be happy if there is poverty around’

(Interview S Mayor M5, 31.10.2017)


‘Nobody saw any other interest in it than extra money’

(Field note L, 13.12.2017)

Potential collective benefit



Each actor's individual risk assessment



Integration mechanism

Sources of collaboration risk

Nature of ICA dilemma

Coordination gains	Economies of scale	Common-pool resources	Integrating externalities
Complementary investments	Joint public procurement		
Inspirations, learning, avoiding duplication	Joint service operator		

Preference diversity

Participants divergence (mayors, local administrators, metropolitan office employees)			Community homophily
Mayor's party affiliation	Implementation efficiency	Level of trust among collaborating actors	Size of municipalities (population, HR)
Mayors geographical origin, capital status	Metropolitan office' employees origin	Personal relations of collaborating actors	Cultural differences between area parts

Existing institutions

Higher-level rules (EU, national and regional level)		Political structure	Existing ICA mechanisms
Scope of LG decentralisation	Available integration mechanisms	Electoral system (mayor, council)	Previous joint initiatives
Tasks delegation, decision-making	Available joint project forms	Political stability (terms, changes)	Personal experience of collaboration
Thematic scope of collaboration	Joint project selection mode		

Sources of collaboration risk

Nature of ICA dilemma

Coordination gains

Complementary investments

Inspirations, learning, avoiding duplication

Economies of scale

Joint public procurement

Joint service operator

Common-pool resources

Integrating externalities

Preference diversity

Participants divergence

(mayors, local administrators, metropolitan office employees)

Community homophily

Existing institutions

Higher-level rules

(EU, national and regional level)

Political structure

Existing ICA mechanisms

Sources of collaboration risk

Nature of ICA dilemma

Coordination gains

Economies
of scale

Common-pool
resources

Integrating
externalities

Preference diversity

Participants divergence

(mayors, local administrators, metropolitan office employees)

Mayor's party
affiliation

Implementation
efficiency

Level of trust
among actors

Mayors
geographical origin,
capital status

Metropolitan office'
employees origin

Personal relations
of actors

Community
homophily

Size of
municipalities
(population, HR)

Cultural differences
between area parts

Existing institutions

Higher-level rules
(EU, national and regional level)

Political structure

Existing ICA
mechanisms

Sources of collaboration risk

Nature of ICA dilemma

Coordination gains

Economies
of scale

Common-pool
resources

Integrating
externalities

Preference diversity

Participants divergence

Community homophily

Existing institutions

Higher-level rules (EU, national and regional level)

Scope of LG decentralisation	Allowed integration mechanisms
Tasks delegation, decision-making	Available joint project forms
Thematic scope of collaboration	Joint project selection mode

Political structure

Electoral system
(mayor, council)

Political stability
(terms, changes)

Existing ICA mechanisms


Previous joint initiatives

Personal experience of collaboration

Potential collective benefit



Each actor's individual risk assessment



Integration mechanism

Collaboration risks

Incoordination

(between partners, with other organisations)

Functional coordination of investments

Operational coordination of projects

Division

Available financial resources

Scope of decision-making power

Available thematic interventions

The number of partners

Defection

General trust among collaborating actors

Level of approval of division mechanism

Time pressure on joint projects


Level of interdependency



Potential collective benefit



Each actor's individual risk assessment



Integration mechanism

Transaction costs

Information

Frequent information exchange on mutual plans & progress	Transparency, training, equal access to knowledge
External projects coordination method	Joint data monitoring system

Negotiation & bargaining

Formal division of resources	Informal division of resources method
Division of tasks among joint projects	Territorial vs. party-based joint executive

Enforcement


Formal rules and sanctions	Informal rule and sanctions
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Potential collective benefit



Each actor's individual risk assessment



Integration mechanism

Integration mechanism



Association

Agreement

Plan of the presentation

Introduction

Research design

Results

Conclusion

Contribution

Political factors in solving collective action dilemmas within ITI implementation in Poland...

...can be effectively studied within the ICA Framework



New context,
empirical
evidence

...partially fit in the existing Framework's elements



Deepening,
new indicators

...partially do not fit in the Framework's elements



Extension,
new elements

...are different at various stages of collaboration





Dynamic,
cyclical
dimension

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Mayors and political parties



- SLD
- PiS
- local committee
- PO
- PSL

ITI added value – initial observations

Local
administrative
capacity

Building relations
among mayors
and coordinators



The habit of
exchanging
information



Testing various
cooperation
models



(a few)
Partnership
projects in FUAs

Good practices
by ITI Offices

ITI failures – initial observations

Mostly short-term effects: unexploited chance

Limited ITI priorities failed to solve key FUA problems

Late start, ambiguity, change of rules – not strategic projects

Often misused ambiguity, limited formal rules

Pressure on fast absorption – resignation from quality.

Winners: associations & masters of changing rules, not high quality.

Need to start from joint analysis of problems and joint documentation.
Need to take transaction costs into account to predict ITI behaviour.

Sanction:
absorption or
recommitment

Guideline:
integrated =
in partnership

Push for
quick
contracting

Push for
integrated
investments

Problem
of unequal
speed
of partners

Problem
of demanding
internal
procedures

ITI Lubelskie:
creating
additional
procedures

ITI SLASKIE:
resigning
from formal
partnerships

ITI
Pomorskie:
limiting
quality
demands

Researcher's dilemmas



Temperament

Me as a...

Assigned role



Ethics


Access
to data


Location



Friendships

Time







Wyzwania dla ZIT – obserwacje

Aktualne

- Zmiana zasad gry w trakcie gry, chaos informacyjny, wymiana kadr w IZ
- Wzrost cen usług, niedoszacowane kosztorysy, nieaktualne dane
- Przyspieszenie kontraktacji, trudne relacje z IZ i MR

Polityczne

- Lokalnie: ordynacja wyborcza, zmiana partnerów, dyrektorów biur ZIT
- Regionalnie: wymiana kadr w IZ, zmiana zasad współpracy i układ sił
- Krajowe: reformy krajowe, wymiana kadr w MR

Organizacyjne

- Finansowanie po 2018 r.
- Ujednolicenie struktur (stowarzyszenia)
- Przyspieszenie certyfikacji – weryfikacja jakości projektów i partnerstw

Strategiczne, zintegrowane działania w MOF – wspólne analizy i plany